Cooperative behaviors evolve by ultimately increasing the inclusive fitness of performers as well as 3 recipients of those behaviors. Such increases can occur via direct or indirect fitness benefits, 4 theoretically explained by reciprocal altruism and kin selection respectively. However, humans are 5 known for cooperating with individuals who are not necessarily genetic relatives, which seemingly 6 precludes kin selection as an explanation. Here, we aim to quantify the relative importance of 7 kinship and social group membership as mediators of cooperative behavior. Using an experimental 8 gift game, we test whether indigenous Saami reindeer herders in Norway give gifts to genetic 9 relatives or to members of their cooperative herding group (the 'siida'), or both. Membership of the 10 same siida strongly increased the odds of gift-giving. Kinship had a smaller, albeit positive, effect. 11
Cooperation is prevalent in a wide range of taxa, including humans. Cooperative behaviors benefit 25 other individuals, either at a cost to the cooperator or not; such behaviors can be favored by 26 selection due to their effects on others (West et al. 2007 ). The most long-standing explanations of 27 the evolution of cooperative behavior are kin selection (Hamilton 1964 ) and reciprocal altruism 28 (Trivers 1971) , both of which are likely to play a role in human social interactions. A panoply of 29 theoretical models of these and other effects have shown how the existence of cooperation is 30 relatively easy to explain in evolutionary terms (Lehmann & Keller 2006; Nowak 2006; West et al. 31 2007) . Ultimately, cooperative behaviors will evolve if they increase the inclusive fitness of the 32 individuals performing the behavior. Exactly with whom one should cooperate, and to what extent, 33 remains a contentious issue that is expected to depend on context. 34
Humans cooperate extensively in many regards. For example, cooperation is vital for survival and 35 reproduction among humans following a pastoralist way of life: a subsistence strategy involving a 36 dependence on livestock. Across the world, most pastoralist societies work in cooperative herding 37 groups formed from multiple families in multiple households (Naess 2012) . Ariaal and Rendille 38 pastoralists of East Africa herd in cooperative units typically formed of siblings' families that, among 39 the Ariaal at least, can fission from the wider settlement (Fratkin 1986 ). In Tibet, the rukor (or ru 40 skor) is a cooperative group which tends to form for the summer and disband during winter 41 (Nietupski 2012) . Mongolian nomadic herders cluster into groups known as Khot-Ail, living and 42 managing livestock as a socio-economic unit (Upton 2008) . Saami pastoralists, the focus of this 43 study, work in a cooperative institution known as the siida (Paine 1994) . 44
Working in cooperative groups has many advantages, allowing herders to pool risk, defend herds 45 from raiders or predators, protect pastureland, share knowledge and information, loan or gift 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r R e v i e w O n l y 3 compared to herding alone, allowing herding groups to achieve economies of scale, i.e. an increase 49 in the percentage of output coupled with a reduction in the costs related to labor investment (Naess 50 et al. 2009; Naess 2012) . 51
Kin selection theory (Hamilton 1964 ) predicts that cooperative behaviors would evolve between 52 genetic relatives as long as the fitness benefits, tempered by the degree of relatedness between 53 them, outweigh the costs. Previous work on Saami reindeer pastoralists has shown that decisions to 54 slaughter are mediated through kin relations ) and that the presence of genetic 55 relatives, along with the availability of workers, had a positive effect on herd size . 56
Such an effect is important for year-on-year household viability as well as during crisis periods; those 57 with large pre-collapse herd sizes also had the largest post-collapse herds (Naess & Bårdsen 2010; 58 Naess & Bårdsen 2013). 59
Group living can lead to a social dilemma where rational actors might choose not to contribute to a 60 common enterprise (i.e. defect) but still try to reap the benefits of other's contributions, eventually 61 leading to a breakdown in cooperation. Avoidance of defectors can allow cooperators to assort 62 together, either through mobility (Aktipis 2011), severing social links (Wang et al. 2012) or choosing 63 partners (Stiff & Van Vugt 2008) . The ability to choose from a 'marketplace' (Noë & Hammerstein 64 1994) of competing potential partners can lead individuals to act more cooperatively in relation to 65 others, resulting in an escalation of 'competitive cooperation' (Barclay & Willer 2007) . Individuals 66 may direct cooperative behaviors to others based on their knowledge of the recipient's reputation 67 (indirect reciprocity (Nowak 2006) ). In biological markets, being cooperative could act as an indicator 68 of status, as can factors such as skill, prestige or experience. 69
Once partners have been chosen, rewards (such as gifts) and punishment may be important 70 mechanisms for maintaining cooperation through partner control (Trivers 1971; West et al. 2007) . 71
However, gift exchange might also function as a method of pooling risk in unpredictable 72
Page 3 of 27
Behavioral Ecology   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Predictions

75
Previous work on Saami pastoralists has looked at how genetic relatedness and labor availability 76 affect cooperation across districts, which are administrative clusters of herding groups (Naess et al. 77 2010; Naess et al. 2012 ). We extend this to investigate the relative effects of kinship and cooperative 78 group membership on gift giving behavior between individuals within a district. Saami pastoralists 79 organize themselves into groups -composed of kin and non-kin -for the purposes of cooperative 80 herding, their primary means of subsistence. Given the reliance on herding groups, we predict a 81 strong cooperative bias towards fellow group members, regardless of whether or not the recipients 82 are genetic relatives. 83
However, this hypothesis does not imply that kinship will be unimportant. One manifestation of kin 84 selection in humans may take the form of inter-generational resources flows from older to younger 85 family members, especially from parents to children (Kaplan 1994 ). Thus, we predict that resources 86 such as gifts would be given preferentially to younger people when they are given within families. 87
We aim to quantify the relative effects of factors predicting cooperative behavior by conducting a 88 culturally salient experimental gift game among Saami reindeer herders living in Finnmark, Northern 89
Norway. Participants could choose between one and three other reindeer herders to receive a gift of 90 money. In order to ensure the game had contextual relevance to participants, we framed the gifts in 91 terms of how much gasoline they could be used to purchase, since gasoline is a valuable commodity 92 The siida is an important economic and cultural unit of cooperation and subsistence (Paine 1994) . 102
Membership is, for the most part, influenced by long-standing relationships between families, some 103 of whom will be genealogically related. Traditionally, the siida was based on conjugal and sibling 104 solidarity, which could be extended to include cousins and other affinal relatives of the same 105 generation (Bergman et al. 2008) . Unmarried people and unrelated wage laborers may also join 106 siidas on a facultative basis. Therefore, siidas can include both kin and non-kin. 107
People from different siidas can interact in a number of ways. With the adoption of snowmobiles 108 and other vehicles as well as communication technologies, herders now live more sedentary lives: 109
Members from several siidas live in the same towns for much of the year. In addition, herders from 110 different siidas may help one another by splitting up mixed herds or finding lost reindeer. Conflicts 111 may also arise, which has resulted in the destruction of fences separating the pasture areas of 112 different siidas, among other issues. 113
In general, herders belong to two siidas: summer and winter. Summer siidas are large groups of 114 households whose reindeer graze on the coastal pastures and islands of Norway. The summer siida 115 became a legal entity in 2007 and can be thought of akin to a corporation with elected boards of 116 leaders. Before the legal consolidation of siidas, membership was more flexible and could change 117 over time; of the herders in our study sample, only 1 person had moved summer siida within the 118 past 15 years. Every year, summer siidas split into 1 or more smaller winter siidas whose herds graze 119
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Behavioral Ecology   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Siidas are also loci for collective action. Siida group members work together on maintenance 137 activities, run slaughterhouses, and gathering herds into corrals so as to weigh and administer 138 medicine to the animals, determine the number and quality of pregnant cows, and split herds by sex 139 before seasonal migrations. Given the conflicts and cooperative behaviors described above, we 140 would expect the siida to represent more than a decision-making body: rather, it would act as an 141 important social unit. The focus of our study is the summer siida. 142 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Participants were endowed with vouchers (see below) and were then asked to give these as 146 anonymous gifts to other licensed herd owners in their district. Respondents were presented with a 147 list of license owners in the district (collected by a combination of publically available contact 148 information and snowball sampling, whereby one participant suggested other potential participants) 149 coded with randomly generated ID numbers. Respondents read the ID numbers of their desired gift 150 recipients to the field assistant. This procedure aimed to minimize experimenter bias, since the 151 assistant was also a member of the district, although not a licensed herd owner. 152
Gift Game
We gave players 3 vouchers, each representing 5 liters of gasoline. At the time, 1 liter of petrol cost 153 approximately NOK 15 (US$ 2.54). Players could choose to give the vouchers to 1-3 other license 154 owners -in multiples of 5 liters. They were not allowed to keep anything for themselves; they had to 155
give the vouchers to at least 1 recipient. Players also gave reasons for their distribution of gifts. We 156 coded these open answers into 1-3 keywords, blind to the giver's name, siida and distribution of gifts 157 (see Supplementary Methods) . At the end of the experimental period, all recipients were given their 158 rewards in the form of cash, since the vouchers were created for the purposes of this study and 159
were not legal tender, although all gift decisions were framed in terms of liters of gasoline. 160
Communication was not allowed within the parameters of the experiment. However, due to the 161 vagaries of the herding lifestyle, we were unable to conduct all interviews within a sufficiently short 162 time to rule out for the chance that herders did not communicate with one another. (2014)). We used the numbers of 174 reindeer held by individuals in 2012 -the most recent data available. We were able to match herd 175 sizes for 62 of the 75 people in our database, not achieving complete coverage due to changes in 176 license owners between 2012 and our study period. Herd sizes were group-mean centered across 177 the district. 178
Statistical Analysis
179
We fitted generalized estimating equation (GEE) models to all potential gift-giving dyads, where the 180 egos were the 30 gift game participants and alters were the 75 licensed owners, giving 30 × (75 − 181 1) = 2,220 possible dyads. The binary response variable in all models was whether or not a gift 182 was given within a dyad. We present unstandardized and standardized estimates, where in the latter 183 case, binary factors were mean-centered and continuous variables were standardized over 2 184 standard deviations to allow estimates to be compared within models, following the 185 recommendations of Gelman (2008) and Schielzeth (2010) . 186 GEE is a population-averaged approach that accounts for multiple observations of each ego by 187 clustering standard errors. We specified an exchangeable working correlation matrix, which models 188 the dependence of observations within clusters. GEE does not use full likelihood estimates, so we 189 computed and compared the quasi-likelihood under the independence model information criterion 190 (QIC) for model selection (Pan 2001) . Note that we did not fit models containing the individual-level 191 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Results
197
Description of the District and the Gift Network
198 61 of the 75 herd owners in the district were male, with a median age of 53 (see Supplementary Fig.  199 S1 for the age distribution and Table S1 for descriptive statistics). The median number of reindeer 200 owned by herders in the district in 2012 was 456.5, ranging between 55 and 1,604 reindeer 201 ( Supplementary Fig. S2 ). The 30 herders interviewed gave 71 gifts to 43 people (Figure 2a ), some of 202 whom were also participants. Of the 71 gifts, 45 (63.4%) were given to members of the same 203 summer siida. A significantly higher proportion of gifts were given within siidas (߯ ଵ ଶ = 4.563, ܲ = 204 0.033). The majority of gifts (59) were for 5 liters of gasoline and were given by 18 of the 30 people 205 interviewed. 5 gifts, given by 5 separate individuals, were worth 10 liters, while 7 gifts, given by 7 206 different people, were for 15 liters. 207
The number of gifts received by individuals (in-degree) ranged from 0 to 7 (median = 1, mean = 0.95, 208 standard deviation [SD] = 1.16). We do not report the number of gifts given (out-degree) or include 209 it in the models since only the 30 people interviewed were able to give gifts. Gift givers received 210 more gifts; that is, out-degree significantly correlated with in-degree (Pearson's product-moment 211 correlation, ‫ݎ‬ = 0.415, ܲ < 0.001, 95% ‫ܫܥ‬ [0.208, 0.587]). One outlier received 7 gifts totaling 50 212 liters of gasoline -twice as much as the second most popular herder. The reasons given for his gifts 213 fell on a wide spectrum, from "Deserves it" and "Good reindeer herder" to "Always empty of fuel". 214 Ten gifts (28.2%) were reciprocated (Figure 2b) , despite communication not featuring in the 215 experiment. Of the reciprocated gifts, only 1 was given to a member of another siida. In this case, 216 both were males living in the same town who clearly had a history of working together based on 217 their stated reasons for giving the gifts. Supplementary Table S2 shows descriptive statistics for the 218 gift network. 219
Siida leaders did not receive more gifts than others (Table 1) . There was a significant sex difference 220 between number of gifts received where males on average received more (Mann-Whitney test, 221 ܹ = 258.500, ܲ = 0.015), although the sample contains substantially fewer females (4 of the 43 222 herders who received gifts). 223
Relatedness in the District
224
The smallest two siidas ('a' and 'f' in Figure 3 ) were formed entirely of siblings and/or parents with 225 children (r ij = 0.5). These siidas contained, respectively, 2 and 3 licensed owners. As the number of 226 members increases, there was no discernible trend in relatedness across the nine siidas. The mean 227 relatedness across the district was r ij = 0.02 (i.e., between 2 nd and 3 rd cousins), whereas the grand 228 mean of mean relatedness within siidas was r ij = 0.19. Due to the small number of groups and their 229 small sizes, we did not perform analyses grouped by individual siidas. 230
Analysis of gift giving
231 Table 2 shows the distribution of gifts, split by whether recipients were genetically related to the 232 giver and/or belonged to the same siida. We calculated correlation coefficients between the 233 networks of gifts, relatedness and siida membership ( Supplementary Table S3 ). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 In the best-fitting GEE model (Table 3) , belonging to the same summer siida as the other person in a 239 dyad was the strongest predictor of gift-giving (standardized log odds = 1.875, S.E. = 0.447) 240 compared to genetic relatedness (standardized log odds = 0.691, S.E. = 0.187). Note that these 241 estimates are only biologically interpretable in their unstandardized form (Table 3) . 242
From the full set of candidate models, the model containing only a term for siida membership 243 (model 5 in Supplementary Table S4 ) fitted the data better than the model containing only a term 244 for relatedness (model 6 in Supplementary Table S4 ). Models with an interaction between 245 relatedness and siida membership (models 3 and 4 in Supplementary Table S4 ) and models 246 containing herd sizes for the potential giver and recipient (models 2 and 4 in Supplementary Table  247 S4) did not provide a better fit compared to the model containing additive terms for relatedness and 248 siida membership (Table 3 ; model 1 in Supplementary Table S4 ). 249
We hypothesized that gifts would preferentially be given to younger herders within families (where 250 gifts to younger herders are scored as a negative age difference). Contrary to expectations, gifts 251 were not preferentially given to younger kin (߯ ଵ ଶ = 0.78, ܲ = 0.38; Table 4 ). Age also had no 252 significant effect on the number of gifts received (Spearman's rank correlation, ρ = −0.235, ܲ = 253 0.211; Figure 4 ). 254
Why give?
255 Table 5 lists the coded translations of all reasons for giving gifts ( Supplementary Table S5 provides 256 the full text). The most common category (n = 24) for giving a gift, regardless of kinship and siida 257 membership, was current or future reciprocity. Thirteen gifts were given to recipients with good 258
reputations. 259
An interesting case is the gifts given to non-kin belonging to other siidas. Over half of these gifts 260
were split between those with reputations of being a 'good herder' and young license owners who 261 were newly established in reindeer husbandry. 262
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Behavioral Ecology summer siidas within the last 15 years. Belonging to the same summer siida was the stronger 265 predictor for gift-giving compared to being genetically related (Table 3) . Interactions between 266 relatedness and siida membership (models 3 and 4 in Supplementary Table S4 ) did not provide a 267 better fit to the data. Similarly, including the herd sizes for the potential gift giver and recipient did 268 not improve the fit (models 2 and 4 in Supplementary Table S4 ). Siida membership may be 269 important for this population if strategies that benefit direct fitness are optimal compared to those 270 increasing indirect fitness. Alternatively, herders might receive inclusive fitness benefits by virtue of 271 assorting into the same groups as kin, whereas cooperation with non-kin might need to be 272 maintained via reward mechanisms such as gift giving. 273
There was no preference for giving gifts to younger herders within families (Table 4 and Figure 4) , 274 contrary to our prediction derived from parental investment theory regarding the flow of resources 275 down generations within families. The absence of this pattern is likely due to participants not 276 viewing the gifts as resources to be invested in younger relatives. It should be noted that some close 277 relatives (such as a son and heir) might be jointly herding with the herd owner and therefore not 278 eligible to receive a gift as they are not yet a licensed herd owner themselves. 279
Twenty-four of the 71 gifts (33.8%) were given for reasons related to existing reciprocal relationships 280 or developing future relationships (Table 5 ). In addition, 10 gifts (28.2%) were reciprocated although 281 the experimental setup did not allow communication between participants (Figure 2b ). This form of 282 direct reciprocity has been conceptualized as an important mechanism behind the evolution of 283 cooperation (Trivers 1971; Nowak 2006) . Our experiment did not explicitly account for either 284 indirect (reputational) or direct reciprocity as mechanisms underlying cooperation; rather, we 285 investigated the relative importance of kinship and social group membership in predicting gift giving. 286
Membership of the same siida may imply multiple opportunities for reciprocation. 287 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 While the stated reasons for why participants gave particular gifts were ad hoc, we argue they 288 provide valuable insight into behavior in the games. Thirteen of the 71 gifts (18.3%) were given to 289 those with the reputation of being a 'good herder' (Table 5) , something important to Saami 290 pastoralists (Paine 1970 ). Gifts were not given preferentially to siida leaders (Table 2) . In this study, 291 we were not able to control for potential confounds such as prestige, skills, experience, etc. that may 292 have biased gift giving behaviors, although we did control for herd size as a proxy of wealth. Given 293 this indication that cultural factors such as reputation may be important mediators of cooperative 294 behavior for Saami reindeer herders, future work could attempt to define measures of reputation 295 and prestige that are meaningful to this population. One approach would be to ask herders, 296 preferably in group interviews, to rank others by their experience, skill, history of good decisions, 297 etc. These culturally derived measures could then be linked to quantitative measures of wealth and 298 used to predict gift giving. 299
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Gifts in our study were small and anonymous, and communication between participants was not 300 allowed. This makes it unlikely that costly signals, reputation or competitive altruism were driving 301 the observed behaviors, although we were unable to test this formally. However 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Naess & Bårdsen 2010) . This suggests the future of reindeer husbandry presents a collective 314 action problem for the herders: one that may be solved from within the community without 315 necessitating the privatization of pastures (Bjørklund 1990; Marin 2006; Hausner et al. 2012) . At 316 present, management policies seem to be designed to attain sustainability by targeting only 317 individual reindeer owners (e.g. providing subsidies to increase slaughter rates), while disregarding 318 the cooperative nature of reindeer pastoralism . Understanding the mechanisms 319 of cooperation in this population will be an important task for its future viability. 320 321 Page 14 of 27 Behavioral Ecology   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Table 3 : Results from the best-fitting generalized estimating equation. Column 2 shows unstandardized log odds (S.E.); 436 column 3 shows log odds (S.E.) standardized over 2 SD (Schielzeth 2010; Gelman 2008 ) so that the effect sizes can be 437 directly compared. The predictors are the coefficient of relatedness, r, and a binary factor coding whether or not a dyad 438 belongs to the same summer siida. The siida membership predictor most strongly predicts gift giving, although relatedness 439 also has a positive effect. See Supplementary Table S4 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38 
